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Over the past three years it has become evident that fake news is a danger to
democracy. However, until now there has been no clear understanding of how to
define fake news, much less how to model it. This paper addresses both these issues.
A definition of fake news is given, and two approaches for the modelling of fake news
and its impact in elections and referendums are introduced. The first approach,
based on the idea of a representative voter, is shown to be suitable to obtain a
qualitative understanding of phenomena associated with fake news at a macroscopic
level. The second approach, based on the idea of an election microstructure, describes
the collective behaviour of the electorate by modelling the preferences of individual
voters. It is shown through a simulation study that the mere knowledge that pieces
of fake news may be in circulation goes a long way towards mitigating the impact of
fake news.
I. INTRODUCTION
“Our democracy is at risk”, summarises the interim report published in July 2018 by the
UK House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee (Collins et al. 2018)
on the dissemination of disinformation on social media for the purpose of manipulating the
public in election and referendum voting. The prevalence of false stories on the internet
has made it difficult for many to distinguish what is true from what is false. The issue
that lies at the heart of the current threat to the democratic process in the US, the UK,
and elsewhere is that, unlike in physical sciences in which the validity of a claim can be
put to the test in a reproducible laboratory experiment, statements about past events are
impossible to prove with the same scientific rigour. The existence of Holocaust denialists,
for instance, illustrates how doubts about a major historical event can gain traction with
certain individuals. To combat the forces of fake news it is important to view the issue
through a scientific lens. Borrowing ideas from communication theory, the present paper
aims at developing the mathematical theory that underlies the modelling of fake news.
In a broad sense the concept of ‘fake news’ has been around for centuries. In ancient
China, for instance, the military strategist Kongming famously made use of state-sponsored
disinformation to his advantage (Shou ∼290). During the Medieval period in Europe, the
spreading of fake news often left violence and death in its wake (see, e.g., Soll 2016). Once
technologies for mass printing had developed, fake news found a new kind of application
in the form of sensationalist reporting to increase newspaper circulation. The demand
for reliable information sources, however, was high in the twentieth century, especially in
the post-war period, which made the running of a newspaper based on honest reporting
2a viable business model. This quasi-stable configuration of mainstream journalism based
predominantly on honest reporting has been thrown out of its apparent equilibrium in the
twenty-first century by the rapid growth of social media usage. As Soll (2016) puts it, “it
wasn’t until the rise of web-generated news that our era’s journalistic norms were seriously
challenged, and fake news became a powerful force again.”
Advances in communication technology have their advantages and disadvantages. While
it is undoubtedly true that the internet, for instance, has made it possible to access informa-
tion that previously would have been difficult to acquire, it is also a matter of fact that the
internet serves as a platform to propagate irrelevant information, or noise. As noise becomes
more pervasive, it becomes increasingly difficult to access reliable information. Ultimately,
as Wiener explained in his insightful book (Wiener 1954), one has to face the implications
of the Second Law of Thermodynamics that asserts that over time, noise will dominate (or,
equivalently, in physicists’ terminology, entropy will increase). Just as in any physical sys-
tem where entropy can be reduced by means of external inputs (such as energy or force), to
combat the domination of noise, concerted efforts have to be made because noise will not
disappear spontaneously. This has important implications for policy makers.
Today, fake news, fuelled by its speed of dissemination, has become a serious concern
to society—perhaps most importantly because it can endanger the democratic process. In
response, academic research into various aspects of fake news has intensified recently, es-
pecially after the 2016 US presidential election and the ‘Brexit’ referendum in the UK on
the membership of the European Union. Broadly speaking, research carried out thus far
has been primarily focused on the retrospective analysis of the impact of fake news (e.g.,
Allcott & Gentzkow 2017, Amador et al. 2017, Bovet & Makse 2018) and on the detection
and prevention of fake news using deep learning and other related techniques (e.g., Conroy
et al. 2015, Shu et al. 2017, Khajehnejad & Hajimirza 2018, Yang et al. 2018). However, to
address the issues surrounding the impact of fake news more generally, to make predictions
of the impact of fake news, and to conduct a comprehensive scenario analysis, it is important
that a consistent mathematical model be developed that describes the phenomena resulting
from the flow of fake news. For such a model to be useful, it should be intuitive (so that
the model can be trusted as a plausible candidate) and tractable (so that model parameters
can be calibrated against real data, and so that predictions can be made, either analytically
or numerically). The purpose of the present paper is to introduce a novel framework for
the mathematical modelling of fake news that fulfils these requirements. Our theory of fake
news and the associated models are simple to simulate and yet they replicate qualitative
features of empirical observations, as demonstrated below.
II. FAKE NEWS AND COMMUNICATION THEORY
Fake news is information that is inconsistent with factual reality. It is information that
originates from the ‘sender’ of fake news, is transmitted through a communication channel
and is then received, typically, by the general public. Hence any realistic model for fake
news has to be built on the successful and well-established framework of communication
theory. Indeed, this philosophy was already advocated by Wiener (1954), who wrote:
It is the thesis of this book that society can only be understood through a study
of the messages and the communication facilities which belong to it; and that in
the future development of these messages and communication facilities, messages
3between man and machines, between machines and man, and between machine
and machine, are destined to play an ever-increasing part.
The modelling framework we propose in this paper embraces Wiener’s philosophy. Specifi-
cally, we shall apply and extend techniques of filtering theory—a branch of communication
theory that aims at filtering out noise in communication channels—in a novel way to generate
models that are well-suited for the treatment of fake news.
The traditional applications of filtering theory are threefold: (i) extrapolation, or predic-
tion, (ii) filtering, and (iii) interpolation, or smoothing (see, e.g., Wiener 1949, Kailath 1974).
Over the past decade, however, a fourth application of filtering theory has been developed,
namely, in phenomenology—the description and modelling of observed phenomena. Perhaps
surprisingly, the domain of applicability of the phenomenological use of filtering techniques
ranges from scales as small as elementary particles and atoms in physical systems (Brody &
Hughston 2006) to scales as large as human activities in social systems (Brody et al. 2007,
2008). In the latter context, to describe the phenomena associated with social systems, it
is particularly natural to employ the mathematics of filtering theory because the actions of
an individual are ultimately based on the result of filtering the noisy information available
to that individual. In other words, it is not the predictive power of filtering theory that is
relevant; rather, it is the fact that the behaviour of people is guided by their predictions via
filters, and thus this behaviour is itself susceptible to a filtering description. These observa-
tions have opened up a promising avenue towards new discoveries and novel applications,
including the one that we explore here for the modelling of fake news.
The paper is organised as follows. We begin by explaining how the techniques of filtering
can be applied in the context of behavioural phenomenology of an individual. We then
apply this idea to the modelling of fake news as a modification of noise, and introduce our
key assumption that, to a good approximation, people are rational inasmuch as they follow
Bayesian logic in their decision making. Hence, in our approach, those who are influenced by
fake news are not viewed as being irrational as such, but rather they lack the ability to detect
and mitigate the changes caused by the presence of fake news in the structure of the noise
they are exposed to. In going from the behavioural model of an individual to that of the
electorate we are in effect introducing the idea of a ‘representative voter’ whose perception
of the uncertain world represents the aggregation of the diverse views held by the public at
large. We then examine the problem of estimating the release times of fake news, which in
turn generates a new type of challenge in communication theory. This estimate is required
for characterising a voter who is aware of the potential presence of fake news, but is unsure
which precise items of information are fake. We show as an illustration the dynamics of the
opinion-poll statistics in a referendum in the presence of a single piece of fake news. An
application to an election in which multiple pieces of fake news are released at random times
is then considered. Illustrative simulation results show that the qualitative behaviour of the
dynamics of the opinion-poll statistics, seen for instance during the 2016 US presidential
election (see, e.g., Silver 2016), can be replicated by our model. To deepen the analysis
further, we introduce what we call an ‘election microstructure’ model in which we employ
the same information-based scheme to describe the dynamical behaviour of individual voters
and the resulting collective voting behaviour of the electorate under the influence of fake
news. We conclude with a summary and a discussion of future directions.
4III. FROM COMMUNICATION THEORY TO PHENOMENOLOGY
Let us begin by explaining the phenomenological application of filtering techniques. In
our decision making we are typically faced with uncertainties so that the most we can do
is to arrive at a ‘best guess’ for what the optimal decision might be. Such situations are
commonly encountered in our every-day lives. Suppose, for instance, one wants to travel
from one location in a city to another. Should one take the bus or travel by underground?
The walk to the bus stop may be shorter, but there might be heavy traffic; on the other
hand, signal failures on the underground might result in a delay. From experience one has
an initial view of how likely it might be that travelling by bus or by underground is better.
To formalise this notion, we let p denote the a priori probability that travelling by bus is
the better choice. Correspondingly, 1 − p will be the a priori probability that it would be
better to travel by underground. In other words, we have a binary random variable X taking
values, say, (0, 1), with corresponding probabilities (p, 1 − p), where X = 0 represents the
bus being the better choice, and X = 1 represents the underground being the better choice.
The initial view, represented by the probability p, however, changes over time. A colleague
who has been travelling on the underground might complain about the signal failure he
encountered. The traffic news on the radio might suggest a delay on the bus route—and
so on. As time progresses, one’s knowledge increases, but uncertainties remain. We wish
to model this type of dynamics. For this purpose, we assume (merely for simplicity) that
reliable knowledge increases linearly in time, at a rate σ. The uncertainty, or noise, is
modelled by a Brownian motion, denoted by {Bt}, which is assumed to be independent of
X because otherwise it cannot be viewed as representing pure noise. Hence, the flow of
information, which we denote by {ξt}, can be expressed in the form
ξt = σXt+Bt. (1)
The quantity of interest is the actual value of X . However, since there are two unknowns,
X and {Bt}, and only one known, {ξt}, a rational individual will consider the probability
that X = 0 (or X = 1) conditional on the information contained in the time series {ξs}0≤s≤t
gathered up to the present time t. In other words, writing (x0, x1) = (0, 1), one considers the
conditional probability P(X = xi|{ξs}0≤s≤t). In this simple model the time series {ξt} is a
Markov process, from which it follows that the conditional probability equals P(X = xi|ξt).
The logical step of converting the prior probabilities P(X = xi) into the posterior prob-
abilities P(X = xi|ξt) is captured by the Bayes formula:
P(X = xi|ξt) = P(X = xi)ρ(ξt|X = xi)∑
j P(X = xj)ρ(ξt|X = xj)
. (2)
Here the conditional density function ρ(ξt|X = xi) for the random variable ξt is defined by
the relation
P (ξt ≤ y|X = xi) =
∫ y
−∞
ρ(ξ|X = xi) dξ, (3)
and is given by
ρ(ξ|X = xi) = 1√
2pit
exp
(
−(ξ − σxit)
2
2t
)
. (4)
5This follows from the fact that, conditional on X = xi, the random variable ξt is normally
distributed with mean σxit and variance t. Recalling that (x0, x1) = (0, 1) we thus obtain
P(X = xi|ξt) =
pi exp
(
σxiξt − 12σ2x2i t
)
p0 + p1 exp
(
σξt − 12σ2t
) , (5)
where p0 = p and p1 = 1 − p. Inferences based on the use of (5) are optimal in the sense
that they minimise the uncertainty concerning the value of X , as measured by the variance
or entropic measures subject to the information available. Hence, a rational individual
will at any given time act in accordance with the changing views expressed in (5). In the
example mentioned above, for instance, the option to travel by bus would be chosen by a
rational individual if at the time t of departure it holds that P(X = 0|ξt) > 12 . (There
are suggestions that people need not act rationally as anticipated by the Bayes rule (e.g.,
Kahneman & Tversky 1974 or Grether & Plott 1979), but other studies suggest that the
Bayes logic is nevertheless a dominant factor (El-Gamal & Grether 1995). It is our opinion
that in the context of signal processing, given the prior, it is reasonable to assume that
people intuitively follow a Bayesian line of thinking.)
The mathematical framework outlined above is that of nonlinear filtering, familiar from
communication theory. In communication theory, the random variable X in the first term
of (1) represents the ‘signal’ that one wishes to estimate in the presence of ambient noise
represented by {Bt}. The parameter σ then determines the signal-to-noise ratio. More
generally, the signal typically changes in time, which can be represented by a time series
{Xt}. The case of a fixed X considered here can thus be viewed as a special case, which
was studied by Wonham (1965). It is important to emphasise, however, that in the context
of communication theory, there is a ‘sender’ actively transmitting the signal; whereas in
our behavioural analysis, we often encounter circumstances where there are receivers but
no senders of the signal, because the random variable X may represent the outcome of a
future real-world event that is not known to anyone, and hence cannot be transmitted by
anyone. Nevertheless, X does exist, and people make decisions in accordance with their
best estimate about X based on partial information available to them. This is the sense in
which mathematical techniques in communication theory can be applied to describe observed
phenomena in science and in society. In what follows we shall extend the foregoing ideas to
tackle the problem of modelling fake news and its impact.
Before we proceed, we remark, incidentally, that although we have considered here the
situation involving two possible alternatives, represented by the binary random variable
X , the complexity of the analysis remains unchanged when X can take multiple values.
Likewise, the assumption that knowledge concerning the value of X is revealed at a constant
rate σ can be relaxed without affecting analytical tractability (cf. Wonham 1965). In this
case, the first term in (1) is replaced by X
∫ t
0
σ(s)ds, where σ(s) represents the information
flow rate at time s. Circumstances where the value of X is revealed with certainty over
a finite time horizon can be modelled by replacing the Brownian noise {Bt} in (1) with a
Brownian bridge over that time horizon (cf. Brody et al. 2007). More generally, in situations
where Brownian motion is not an appropriate model for uncertainties (if the noise process
can have jumps, for instance), then one can model the noise term by a general Le´vy process,
again without affecting analytical tractability (Brody et al. 2013).
6IV. MODELLING FAKE NEWS
We now observe that when fake news is released, for instance by a malicious individual
aiming to mislead the public, the false information is superimposed on other information.
However, fake news, by its nature, does not represent truth statements about the value of
the quantity X that people wish to determine, so it cannot be viewed as forming part of the
signal that helps people discover the true value of X . On the other hand, from the point
of view of signal processing, anything that is not part of the signal can be viewed as noise.
Following this logic, we thus arrive at our model for the information process in the presence
of fake news:
ηt = σXt+Bt + Ft, (6)
where the time series {Ft} represents fake news. The noise term {Bt}, which has no bias,
represents the union of a large number of unsubstantiated rumours and speculations about
the value of X . The law of large numbers then suggests the normality of the noise distribu-
tion, making Brownian motion a viable candidate for modelling noise. The time series {Ft}
thus introduces an additional bias. We can now offer a precise mathematical answer to the
open issue raised in the UK House of Commons Committee Report on fake news (Collins,
et al. 2018):
There is no agreed definition of the term ‘fake news’, which became widely used
in 2016. Claire Wardle ... told us ... that “when we are talking about this
huge spectrum, we cannot start thinking about regulation, and we cannot start
talking about interventions, if we are not clear about what we mean”.
With this in mind, we propose the following:
Definition (Fake News). A time series {Ft} appearing in the information process (6) rep-
resents ‘fake news’ if it has a bias so that E[Ft] 6= 0, where E denotes expectation.
The existence of bias here is important, for otherwise {Ft} would merely represent noise,
rather than deliberate misinformation. It is certainly the case that additional unbiased noise
is a nuisance, delaying the process of discovering the truth, but it cannot ultimately drive
the public away from discovering the truth. As regards the statistical dependency between
{Ft} and X , there are two situations that can arise: one in which no one knows the value
of X , in which case {Ft} should be independent of X , and one in which the value of X is
known to a small number of individuals who may wish to disseminate fake news, in which
case {Ft} may well be dependent on X .
The idea that information-based models of the kind represented in (1) can be extended
to model deliberate misspecifications of the truth has previously been envisaged (Brody &
Law 2015). The proposal there was that a malicious individual who wishes to manipulate
the public can alter the value of the information flow rate σ. Hence the public would
make their inferences based on a particular value of σ, whereas the actual value of σ is in
fact different, and as a consequence the public is misled. Such a scheme amounts to setting
Ft = µXt for some µ, which might arise in an election microstructure model described below
in which the value of X may be known to the candidate but not to the public, thus allowing
the candidate to transmit X-dependent fake news. More generally, taking into account
the randomness in the release time, one might consider a fake-news structure of the form
Ft = µX(t−τ)1{t > τ}. This is equivalent to having the information process ξt = σˆXt+Bt
7with a random σˆ, for which analytic expressions for the conditional probabilities can be
obtained (Brody & Law 2015).
In order to analyse the effects of fake news, it will be useful to classify members of the
public into three different categories. We define Category I to indicate those who are unaware
of the potential existence of fake elements in the information they see. Nevertheless, they
act rationally in that they make their estimates in accordance with formula (5), except that
ηt is substituted in place of ξt. In other words, they ‘correctly’ infer the posterior probability,
but based on the mistaken belief that the information they are receiving is of the type (1),
while in reality it is of the type (6). As we shall see, the people in this category are most
vulnerable to exposure to fake news. We denote by Category II those members of the public
who are aware of the potential existence of fake news, but without knowing precisely the
times at which the items of fake news in the time series {Ft} are released. These individuals
face the most technically challenging task, because in their estimation they must deal with
three unknowns, X , {Bt}, and {Ft}, but only one known, {ηt}. As we shall see below, while
analytic expressions for the conditional probability P(X = xi|{ηs}0≤s≤t) can be obtained,
the analysis is more involved than the one for Category I voters. Thus, the people in this
category are considerably more aware of the uncertainties in their estimates, as compared to
those in Category I. Finally, Category III consists of those people that are highly informed
to the extent that they know the values of the time series {Ft}. Because {Ft} contains no
information relevant to X , they can simply disregard {Ft} from their information {ηt} and
use ξt = ηt − Ft instead to work out their posterior belief according to (5). Like those in
Category I, people in Category III would likely be assertive about their judgements. We note
however that a Category-III individual should be regarded to some extent as an idealisation.
After all, it is an almost insurmountable task for any given individual to perfectly identify
which items of news are fake and which ones are not.
V. ESTIMATING THE ARRIVAL TIMES OF FAKE NEWS
From the point of view of those belonging to Category II of our classification, there are
two issues to address: First, one must estimate whether the information source has been
contaminated with fake news. Based on this consideration, one must then determine the
conditional probability P(X = xi|{ηs}0≤s≤t), which gives the best estimate for the likelihood
of the event X = xi. Note that the former issue amounts to working out the conditional
probability ft(u)du = P(τ ∈ du|{ηs}0≤s≤t) that τ takes a value within the small interval
[u, u+ du], which we shall work out.
Before we proceed, we remark that there is an intensively-studied research area within
communication theory that is concerned with the ‘change-point detection’ or ‘disorder detec-
tion’ problem (Page 1954, Shiryaev 1963a, 1963b). The nature of this problem is as follows.
One observes a time series with the property that the structure of the series changes at
some random time. In a situation where this transition is not immediately apparent from
observed data the task is to detect whether a ‘regime change’ has occurred, and if so, when it
might have occurred. Stated mathematically, a prototype of such a problem is to detect the
random time τ at which a Brownian motion acquires a drift (Karatzas 2003), or to detect
the random time τ at which the jump rate of a Poisson process changes from one to another
(Galchuk & Rozovskii 1971, Davis 1976, Peskir & Shiryaev 2002). In the Brownian context,
therefore, the observation is modelled by a process of the form Bt + µ(t − τ)1{t ≥ τ},
which is the same as setting σ = 0 and Ft = µ(t − τ)1{t ≥ τ} in our information process
8{ηt}. Here 1 denotes the indicator function so that 1{A} = 1 if A is true and 1{A} = 0
otherwise. Thus, we see that the analysis of fake news introduces a new type of problem in
signal detection, where one wishes to detect the unknown signal X in a noisy environment
where the structure of the noise switches from one regime to another at a random time. In
other words, one is trying to detect the moment of the switch—that is, the time τ at which
fake news emerges—while at the same time estimating X . It should be intuitively clear that
such a problem will have a wide range of applications beyond fake news analysis.
With this in mind, let us examine the conditional density for τ in the context of at
most one piece of fake news. For this purpose, let us consider the following form of the
model for fake news, given by Ft = m(t− τ)1{t ≥ τ}, where m(−) is an arbitrary function
which we assume to be at least once differentiable. This is the form of the fake news model
that a Category II voter assumes to be the true model. Then a calculation shows that the
conditional density for τ is given by
ft(u) =
f0(u)
∑
i
pi e
∫
t
0
(σxi+m
′(s−u)1{s≥u})dηs−
1
2
∫
t
0
(σxi+m
′(s−u)1{s≥u})2ds
∫∞
0
f0(w)
∑
i
pi e
∫
t
0
(σxi+m′(s−w)1{s≥w})dηs−
1
2
∫
t
0
(σxi+m′(s−w)1{s≥w})2dsdw
, (7)
where m′(u) = dm(u)/du and pi = P(X = xi). Note that f0(u) is the prior density for
τ , which reflects the initial view on how the release timing is distributed. Hence, the best
estimate for the release time of fake news is given by
∫∞
0
uft(u)du.
With the help of ft(u) we are now in the position to address the estimation of X for the
Category II public. From the tower property of conditional expectation we can write
E[X|{ηs}0≤s≤t] = E[E[X|{ηs}0≤s≤t, τ ]|{ηs}0≤s≤t].
Our strategy is to work out the inner expectation first. Since conditional on τ the information
process {ηt} is Markov, this reduces to F (ηt, τ) = E[X|ηt, τ ], which, on account of the Bayes
formula, is given by
F (ηt, τ) =
∑
k xkpk exp
(
σxkηt − 12σ2x2kt− σxkm(t− τ)1{t ≥ τ}
)
∑
k pk exp
(
σxkηt − 12σ2x2kt− σxkm(t− τ)1(t ≥ τ)
) . (8)
It follows that the best estimate forX is given by
∫∞
0
F (ηt, u)ft(u)du. The foregoing analysis
shows that while it is possible to deduce a closed-form expression for the best estimate of
the quantity X that one wishes to determine, the procedure is somewhat intricate. Note
that we have treated the case of a single piece of fake news being released at a random time.
However, the mathematical formalism describing Category II voters can be extended in a
straightforward manner to the case where multiple items of fake news are released. We shall
see below simulations of this more general setup.
VI. REPRESENTATIVE VOTER FRAMEWORK
With the foregoing discussion in mind, the classification arising from our modelling setup
is clear: There are those members of the public who are easily misled and manipulated since
they ignore, by choice or otherwise, the possible existence of fake news; those who are wary
of the potential existence of fake news but cannot be too certain about their judgements;
9and those who are able to detect and disregard fake news. The characteristics of these three
categories can be captured most easily by means of simulation studies. For this purpose,
let us consider a yes-or-no referendum scenario with a simple linear model for fake news:
Ft = µ(t − τ)1{t ≥ τ}. Here, µ is a constant whose sign corresponds to which way the
public will be misled, and τ is an exponentially distributed random variable, with density
f(u) = λe−λu, λ > 0 a constant.
We let the realisation X = 1 be associated with the ‘yes’ vote and X = 0 with the ‘no’
vote. In particular, we interpret the likelihoods for the events X = 1 and X = 0 to represent
the aggregate opinion of the public. That is to say, p = P(X = 1) represents the current
percentage of the public who intend to vote ‘yes’, and conversely for 1 − p = P(X = 0).
Thus the a priori probability p can be calibrated from today’s opinion-poll statistics. The
public opinion, however, changes over time in accordance with the flow of information, and
hence the a priori probability will be updated accordingly.
It is worth remarking that whereas in the earlier discussion on the phenomenological
application of filtering techniques we described the modelling of the behaviour of an indi-
vidual, here we take an ensemble point of view in which the a priori probability p refers to
the aggregation of the diverse opinions held by the public (see Brody & Hughston (2013)
for a similar concept). The idea that we advocate here is that of a “representative voter”
framework, in analogy with representative agent models in economics. This is useful for
the purpose of obtaining a qualitative understanding of the observed phenomena. We shall
later in the paper return to the level of individual behaviour by introducing an alternative
“election microstructure” framework in analogy with market microstructure models in eco-
nomics. This is useful for the purpose of developing countermeasures against fake news, and
for policy making.
In the present ensemble formalism, the event that the random variable X takes the value
zero can be interpreted as the situation in which the totality of voters agree that they should
be voting for the ‘no’ outcome. If the information flow-rate parameter σ were constant, then
indeed the value of X would be revealed asymptotically, and the public opinion would thus
eventually converge to one choice or the other, over an infinite time horizon. Of course, this
rarely happens in real life, because in reality σ is time dependent and tends to vanish after
the election has taken place. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable in the present context to
make the assumption that σ is a constant, since we are only interested in the dynamics up
to the polling day.
With these preliminary remarks in mind, we have simulated typical sample paths cor-
responding to the three voter categories by arbitrarily choosing the model parameters
(µ, σ, λ, p). The results of the simulation are illustrated in Figure 1. The expected main
feature of the simulation paths is that the voters unaware of the existence of fake news are
swayed towards the intended direction. What is perhaps less obvious is the fact that the
Category II voters, who are aware of the possible existence of fake news, but do not know
the timing of its release, tend to overcompensate for the possibility that the information
they are receiving may be contaminated. As a consequence, their estimates deviate away
from the ‘correct’ (Category III) estimate before fake news is released. However, once the
fake news is released, Category II voters do surprisingly well at removing the effects of fake
news from their estimates. One can interpret this as an indication that mere knowledge of
the possibility of fake news is already a powerful antidote to its effects. Further evidence of
this will be seen below in our discussion of election microstructure models.
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FIG. 1: Referendum simulation. A typical sample path associated with the linear fake-news model is
sketched. The left panel shows the information processes {ξt} without fake news (in green) and {ηt} with
fake news (in blue) — released here at time 0.4. The evolution of public opinion over time is shown on the
right panel for the three types of voters: (I) those who are unaware of the existence of fake news (in blue);
(II) those who are aware of the potential existence of fake news (in orange); and (III) those who are able to
disregard fake news fully (in green). Here, X = 0 corresponds to the ‘no’ outcome, and X = 1 corresponds
to the ‘yes’ outcome. We see that in this particular sample path, a majority of category III voters will vote
for the ‘no’ outcome. However, it is evident that a piece of fake news that attempts to sway the voters
in favour of the ‘yes’ outcome has had the effect of moving the percentage figure of category I voters by a
little over 2%—just enough to change the majority vote to ’yes’. On the other hand, the relative proximity
of category II and category III curves shows that category II voters are able to largely correct for their
exposure to fake news. The parameters chosen for the simulation are µ = 0.5, σ = 0.3, λ = 3, p = 0.5, and
for the random variable X , the sample outcome is X = 0.
VII. APPLICATION TO OPINION-POLL STATISTICS IN AN ELECTION
We proceed to model the dynamics for opinion-poll statistics in an election where fake
news is present. For simplicity, we shall assume that there are just two dominant candidates,
represented by a binary random variable X , taking the values 0 and 1 that correspond to the
two candidates, with a priori probabilities p and 1− p, respectively. As indicated earlier, in
the representative voter framework the a priori probability p represents the diverse opinions
and mixed views initially held by the public about which valueX should take. The opinion of
the public, however, evolves over time in accordance with the revelation of information, which
we model by the process {ηt}. In the event in which the public at large favours candidate
0, a malicious individual supporting candidate 1 might in response decide to release a false
statement about candidate 0. According to our previous model Ft = µ(t − τ)1{t ≥ τ}
the contribution of fake news continues to grow at a rate µ > 0. However, in reality one
might expect that over time the strength of any one fake news item diminishes. Thus, we
shall consider here a modification of Ft whereby the strength of fake news initially grows
linearly in time, but is then damped exponentially. In other words, we let the contribution
to Ft of a single item of fake news released at time τ be given by m(t− τ)1{t ≥ τ}, where
m(u) = µue−αu for some damping rate α > 0, and τ is distributed according to f(u) = λe−λu.
Once the effects of fake news are sufficiently damped, the public support may revert back
towards the direction of candidate 0. However, another item of fake news may be released,
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FIG. 2: Election dynamics without and with fake news. In this example, in the absence of fake news
Candidate B (in blue), who initially struggles somewhat in the opinion poll, nevertheless manages to win
the election comfortably (left panel). However, with persistent fake news (released in this example on nine
occasions, indicated by the vertical lines), the public is misled sufficiently for Candidate A (in red) to secure
a narrow victory (right panel). Of the 100K simulations we conducted with the same parameter choice, the
losing candidate ended up winning the election owing to fake news in some 30% of the cases. The parameters
are as follows: σ = 0.3, µ = 2, α = 5, p = 0.5, and λ = 10.
and so on. The process will be repeated until polling day.
The structure of our model should now be evident. At time τ1 comes the release of
the initial piece of fake news, to be damped gradually, at time τ2 comes the next release,
and so on. The waiting times between fake news releases are modelled by an exponential
distribution. In other words, the release times are the jump times of a Poisson process. We
are interested in a simulation study of the dynamical evolution of opinion-poll statistics in
the presence of various pieces of fake news. For simplicity, we consider fake news to be one
sided, i.e. it is released only by the supporters of one of the candidates. For the purpose of
simulation we shall also assume that the damping rates for the various fake news releases are
all equal, and similarly for the linear growth rates. Typical sample paths resulting from the
simulation studies are shown in Figure 2. For clarity, we show only Category I and Category
III voters. In this way, we can see the full, unmitigated effect of fake news. We see that
for this sample path the candidate who would win the election in the absence of fake news
ends up losing it. In fact, based on the parameter choice indicated in the figure caption, we
found that the likelihood of the ‘losing’ candidate (who would have lost the election in the
absence of fake news) ending up winning is about 30%. This number, of course, depends on
the choice of model parameters, and thus can be increased arbitrarily by increasing the fake
news strength or frequency parameters. Thus, while each element of fake news is damped
exponentially in time, a persistent attack on democracy can and will succeed if no action is
taken against it.
VIII. ELECTION MICROSTRUCTURE MODELS
The representative voter framework presented above is highly effective in modelling the
stylised aspects of fake news and its impact at a phenomenological level. It can also be
applied in an efficient scenario analysis by means of simulation studies, for instance, the
12
parameter dependence of the likelihood of fake news changing the outcome of an election.
We shall now turn to an alternative formulation that focuses on the microscopic level of
individual voters to deduce the macroscopic behaviour of the general public. While the
mathematical ingredients used in this election microstructure model are essentially the same
as those used for the representative voter framework, there is one important conceptual
difference, namely, that in the election microstructure model the signal in the information
process can be transmitted by a sender (e.g., the candidate). What follows is framed in the
language of political elections, but the treatment is equally applicable to referendums.
Our model is based on the following idea, which represents a somewhat simplified char-
acterisation of the mechanism by which an individual arrives at their preferred choice of
candidate: When deciding who to vote for in an election, an individual will attempt to eval-
uate candidates with respect to a number of issues, or factors. For instance, what are the
candidates’ views on taxation, on social welfare, on freedom of the press, on immigration, on
abortion, on transport, on gun control, on healthcare, on public spending, etc? Nonpolitical
elements may also be considered, such as the state of health of the candidate, or the level of
personal integrity, etc. As we shall outline below, the candidates’ positions on these factors
are then transformed into an overall score, and the voter ultimately picks the candidate with
the highest score.
To proceed let us assume that there are K independent such factors in an election with
L candidates and N voters. We let X lk denote the l-th candidate’s position on the k-th
factor. However, candidates’ positions on these factors, if they were in office, are not always
immediately transparent to voters. Nevertheless, during an election campaign, candidates
will attempt to communicate their positions to the electorate. This communication flows
through a number of channels: through advertising by the campaigns, through publications
by news outlets, through word-of-mouth, through social media, etc. The members of the
electorate thus obtain partial information, which we shall model as before in the form
ηk,lt = σk,lX
l
k t+B
k,l
t + F
k,l
t (9)
for k = 1, 2, . . . , K and l = 1, 2, . . . , L. In other words, we have a total of KL information
processes {ηk,lt }. Some of these may be contaminated by fake news, which can take different
forms. For instance, candidates may try to make themselves look more palatable to a wider
section of the electorate than they perhaps are (for instance, by lying about their health,
or their views on taxation). They may run negative ads to spread untruths or half-truths
about their opponents. Or there may be malicious agents spreading entirely fabricated
stories supporting one candidate or the other. It is this latter type of fake news that can
spread quickly on social media and has thus attracted much attention recently.
A member of the electorate has their own views on how attractive a candidate with a
given set of factor values is. We model this by a score function, which can differ between
individuals and assigns a measure of attractiveness to a candidate with a given factor vector
X
l. Hence, a member of the electorate will vote for the candidate with the highest score.
For the purposes of the present paper, we consider linear score functions. Thus, the score
Sln of candidate l determined by voter n is given by
Sln =
K∑
k=1
wknX
l
k = wn ·X l, (10)
supposing the vector X l were known. The weights {wkn} may be positive or negative, with
magnitudes that may be large or small depending on how strongly the voter feels about
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a given issue. Keeping in mind that the factors need to be estimated from the available
information, voter n will choose candidate l over candidate l′ if and only if
K∑
k=1
wkn
(
Et[X
l
k]− Et[X l
′
k ]
)
> 0, (11)
or more succinctly wn · (Et[X l] − Et[X l′ ]) > 0. Here we let Et[−] denote the expectation
conditional on having observed the information processes {ηk,ls } up to time t. Each compo-
nent of the conditional expectations Et[X
l] can be worked out by following the methodology
described earlier, on account of the independence of policy factors X lk and X
l
k′ for k 6= k′.
(We shall make the reasonable assumption that noise terms for independent factors are in-
dependent, and make a further simplifying assumption that the release times of fake news
associated with independent factors are likewise independent.)
A population of voters can now be modelled by proposing a distribution over weight
vectors {wn}. By randomly sampling from this distribution and computing, for each sample,
which candidate is preferred, one can build up a population-level picture of voting patterns
and investigate, in particular, the effect of fake news. In practice, such a distribution could
be obtained by asking randomly chosen voters a series of questions in order to generate an
approximation of their weight vectors. Moreover, large internet companies (such as search
engines, social networks, and retailers) possess data that is likely rich enough to reliably
estimate these weights for individual users. This places such companies in a position of
great responsibility. It should be evident that the knowledge of the weight vectors {wn} is
highly valuable in order to implement a targeted campaign. In particular, there is a concern
that if such a targeted campaign were carried out by originators of fake news, democracy
could be at risk. However, the simulation studies below support the notion that the mere
knowledge that there might be fake news in circulation may be sufficient to eliminate the
majority of the impact of fake news.
IX. OPINION POLLS IN THE MICROSTRUCTURE MODEL
We now present simulation results in the case where candidates are evaluated by three
binary independent factors, in an election with two candidates. For concreteness let us sup-
pose that the three factors concern whether the candidate is liberal or conservative; whether
the candidate is healthy or not; and whether the candidate has good or bad character. For
the purpose of this simulation, let us assume that the hidden characteristics of the two
candidates, labelled here as A and B, are such that XA1 = 1 (candidate A is liberal) and
XB1 = −1 (candidate B is conservative); XA2 = 1 (candidate A is in good health) and
XB2 = −1 (candidate B is in bad health); and XA3 = 1 (candidate A has good character)
and XB3 = −1 (candidate B has bad character) — names and values chosen purely for
illustrative purposes. Voters try to estimate these factor values based on the information
available to them.
We take the number of voters to be N = 1 million, and we sample the weight vectors
according to the following prescription: we draw the weight vectors of 55% of voters from a
three-dimensional normal distribution with standard deviation 0.4, Distribution 1, centred
at (1, 1, 1), but restricted to the positive values for the second dimension and restricted to
the interval [0, 1] for the third dimension. The truncation reflects the fact that voters are
unlikely, for instance, to actively prefer candidates with ill health or with bad character.
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FIG. 3: Proportion of population voting for candidate A as time passes. These curves are taken
as averages over 1,000 runs. Category I voters are those that are unaware of the existence of
fake news; category III voters are those who can fully eliminate fake news and thus represent the
‘correct’ estimates. We see that fake news, which is designed to support candidate B, has the
intended effect on average, making an election which candidate A should win comfortably more
competitive. These effects can be magnified or decreased by varying the parameters of the fake
news terms in the information processes. We also recognise that Category II voters are successfully
correcting for most of the effects of fake news. The parameters used in the simulation are: σ = 0.2,
|µ| = 1.5, α = 4, p = 0.5, and N = 1M. Waiting times between fake news releases are drawn at
random for each run from an exponential distribution with rate parameter 4. The code used for
these simulations is available at github.com/dmmeier/Fake News.
Members of this part of the population tend to prefer liberal, healthy candidates of good
character. We then draw the weight vectors of the remaining 45% of the population from the
same, truncated normal distribution (Distribution 2), but centred at (−1, 1, 0), representing
voters that prefer a conservative, healthy candidate, but that are indifferent in relation to
the candidate’s character. (The distributions are chosen purely for illustrative purposes.)
It is evident that candidate A, whose factor vectorXA = (1, 1, 1) coincides with the centre
of Distribution 1 representing 55% of the population, tends to win the election in the absence
of fake news. However, we now assume that in the run-up to the election various pieces of
fake news are released that purport to show that the health and character of candidate A
are bad, that the health and character of candidate B are good, that candidate A is more
conservative than they seem to be, and that candidate B is more liberal. The intended
effect of these elements of fake news is clear: Shifting the perceived vector of factors XA of
candidate A out of the centre of Distribution 1 while at the same time moving candidate B
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towards it. Clearly, this increases the chances candidate B has of winning the election.
In order to isolate the effect of fake news in our simulations, we take the prior probabilities
for all six random variables {XAk , XBk }k=1,2,3 to be 0.5 for the value 1 and 0.5 for the value
−1. This means that the population starts out in a fully agnostic state. To model fake
news we employ our earlier model in which the effect of a piece of fake news initially grows
linearly in time but is then damped exponentially. In Figure 3 we show the average over
1,000 simulations, calculating voting proportions over time for each of the voter categories.
The code used for these simulations is available at github.com/dmmeier/Fake_News.
The results show that in the absence of fake news candidate A on average wins the elec-
tion quite handsomely—this corresponds to the Category III curve. Fake news of the type
constructed above, however, pushes the relative voting proportions of Category I voters, who
are unaware of the existence of fake news, in favour of candidate B, as we had anticipated.
What is perhaps most striking here is the curve showing estimates for Category II voters.
These voters possess the knowledge that there may be fake news in circulation, but they do
not know how many pieces of fake news have been released, or at what precise time. That
is, they only know the statistical distribution of {Ft}, or equivalently, the prior distribution
f0(u). In spite of this, Category II voters are able to reduce the effects of fake news signif-
icantly by developing a statistical understanding of the nature of fake news and correcting
their estimates accordingly. Furthermore, preliminary simulation studies suggest that their
performance is robust against modest misspecifications of the prior distribution.
X. DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK
We have presented two approaches for the modelling of fake news in elections and ref-
erendums: one based on the idea of a representative voter, useful to obtain a qualitative
understanding of the effects of fake news, and one based on the idea of an election mi-
crostructure, useful for practical implementation in concrete scenarios. In both cases the
results illustrate rather explicitly the impact of fake news in elections and referendums. We
have demonstrated that by merely possessing the knowledge of the possibility that pieces
of fake news might be in circulation, a diligent individual (Category II) is able to largely
mitigate the effects of fake news.
The models presented here invite further development in a number of directions. Our
simulations, for instance, were based on random draws of waiting times for the release of
fake news. However, in reality, a malicious individual trying to influence an election is
likely to try to optimise release times to maximise impact (e.g., to maximises the chances
of winning the election). It would be interesting to include such optimal release strategies
in our models. Furthermore, as indicated above, in our simulations Category II voters are
assumed to know the parameters of the fake news terms. This included, in particular, the
value of the fake-news drift parameter µ and the damping rate α. A natural extension of
the model would allow for these parameters to be themselves random. Finally, the election
microstructure approach could be developed further by allowing dependencies between the
various factors, or by introducing several different information processes reflecting the news
consumption preferences of different sections of society. These generalisations will open up
challenging but interesting new directions for research.
At any rate, the performance of Category II voters, which significantly exceeded the ex-
pectations of the present authors, leads to a hopeful conclusion indeed: namely, by ensuring
that members of the electorate are made aware of the possibility and the nature of fake
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news in the information they consume, policy makers may find success in countering the
dark forces of fake news.
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